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Abstract 
The mathematical foundations of model-based diagnostics or diagnosis from first principles have 
been laid by Reiter (1987). In this paper we extend Reiter’s ideas of model-based diagnostics 
by introducing probabilities into Reiter’s framework. This is done in a mathematically sound and 
precise way which allows one to compute the posterior probability that a certain component is not 
working correctly given some observations of the system. A straightforward computation of these 
probabilities is not efficient and in this paper we propose a new method to solve this problem. Our 
method is logic-based and borrows ideas from assumption-based reasoning and ATMS. We show how 
it is possible to determine arguments in favor of the hypothesis that a certain group of components is 
not working correctly. These arguments represent he symbolic or qualitative aspect of the diagnosis 
process. Then they are used to derive a quantitative or numerical aspect represented by the posterior 
probabilities. Using two new theorems about the relation between Reiter’s notion of conflict and 
our notion of argument, we prove that our so-called degree of support is nothing but the posterior 
probability that we are looking for. Furthermore, a model where each component may have more than 
two different operating modes is discussed and a new algorithm to compute posterior probabilities in 
this case is presented. 0 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. 
Kqvroortls: Model-based diagnostics: Arsumption-based reasoning; ATMS: Probability; Propositional logic: 
Support: Algorithm of Abraham 
1. Introduction and overview 
It can happen that input-output systems made up of several components do not operate 
as they were designed to do. This discrepancy between the theoretical and actual behavior 
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of the system occurs when there is a difference between the actual output of the system 
and the output that should have been observed with a system that is working correctly. 
Such a difference is due to the malfunctioning of one or more components of the system 
and the diagnosis problem is to identify those faulty components responsible for the 
malfunctioning of the system as a whole. The identification of faulty components is the 
diagnosis problem and there are many theories and models to handle it. In this paper we 
follow and extend the ideas put forward by Reiter [3 l] in his theory of diagnosis from first 
principles. Other substantial contributions to model-based diagnostic reasoning are those 
of Davis [9], de Kleer [lo], de Kleer and Williams [13], Genesereth [16], Reggia et al. 
[29,30]. 
The goal of this paper is to present a general theory of diagnosis in the sense that it 
can be used as an aid to identify the faulty components that should be replaced. We use 
a logic-based approach to solve the diagnosis problem. As in Reiter [31], it is supposed 
that the system is made up of a set C = (cl, . . . cn } of components. The predicate ab(c, ) 
indicates that the component ci is faulty, is in an abnormal state. It is not excluded that 
several components are faulty. The way the entire system is working, i.e., how the different 
components interact in the system, is described by a set XS of logical formulas in a specific 
language L built from the predicates ah(ci), i = 1, . . n, as well as other atoms and 
elements. The observed input and output values of the system are also represented by a 
set of formulas X0 in the language C. 
Then a probabilistic model is introduced into this framework, an aspect that is not 
considered at all in the paper of Reiter [31]. Before observing anything about the system, 
prior probabilities are assigned to the components: let pi denote the probability that the 
component c; is intact, i.e., c; is working correctly. With each component ci we associate a 
Boolean variable xi indicating whether the component is intact (xi = 1) or faulty (x; = 0). 
It is assumed that the variables xi are independent random variables. A Boolean vector 
x = (xl, . , x,) in (0, l}‘* is called a system state. Then, before any observation is made, 
the probability of a particular system state x = (XI, . . , x,, ) is given by 
p(r)&:‘(l -p;)(lPV (1) 
i=l 
p is a probability distribution on the set of all system states R = (0, 1)“. Now suppose 
that an observation of the system is made, for example, the values of some variables are 
measured. These observation are described by a set of formulas X0 in the language C. 
Then, given this new information represented by the observations, many system states 
become impossible. Let NC denote the set of impossible system states and let Nd denote the 
complementary set of system states that remain compatible with the observations. A system 
state x E Nd is a possible explanation of the observations. In other words, it is a possible 
“diagnosis” of the system. On the other hand, a system state x E NC is in conflict with the 
observations and hence is called a “conflict”. So, given the observations, the only possible 
system states are those in the set Nd. In accordance with the rules of probability theory, this 
means that the prior probability measure p defined on the set of all system states (0, l}” 
by Eq. (1) must be conditioned on the new event Nd, which leads to the new probability 
measure p’ given by 
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P(x)/P(Nd) ifx E Nd, 
if x E N,., 
(2) 
where p(Nd) is obtained by summing the p(x) over all x E Nd. The probability measure 
p’ is the posterior probability of the system states given the observations. For example, this 
probability measure can be used to compute the (posterior) probability that component c, 
is faulty as follows. If Ni denotes the set of all system states x such that x; = 0 then the 
event that ci is faulty is represented by Ni . The prior probability of this event is p; whereas 
its posterior probability is given by 
P’(N) = p(Ni INd) = 
p(Ni n Nd) 
p(Nd) 
= c P’(X). 
XGN;n& 
(3) 
The posterior probability of other events of interest can be computed in a similar way. The 
posterior distribution gives information about the likelihood of components being faulty. 
This information is useful for decision making. 
Efficient methods for the computation of this posterior distribution is the main subject 
of this paper. Since there are 2n states, a direct computation of p’ is not feasible even for 
systems containing a relatively small number n of components. Therefore, a logic-based 
method to cope with the complexity of this problem is proposed. 
The determination of the event Nd, the event on which the probability p is conditioned 
upon, is of fundamental importance in our approach. Since the observations only implicitly 
define Nd, it is important to find a way to represent this set. To do this, ideas and 
theorems presented by Reiter [3 l] are used. Basically, the set Nd will be represented by a 
logical formula, more precisely a disjunctive normal form, in the propositional language S 
generated by the atoms ab(ci), i = 1, . . , II. How to do this is explained in Reiter’s paper 
[31]. When this is done, the problem of computing p’ is not solved directly, but another, 
indirect route will be taken which proves to have a lot of advantages as will be explained. 
Starting from the symbolic representation of Nd as a logical formula in S, we develop a 
theory based on the ideas of probabilistic assumption-based reasoning and ATMS proposed 
by Provan [28], Laskey and Lehner [25] and Kohlas and Monney [22]. As will be explained 
in the paper, this leads to the determination of the so-called support of an event H C 62, 
which is a logical formula s(H) in the language S that entails the event H given the system 
description and the observations (see below for details). 
Then it is shown that the probability of provability of H, that is the so-called degree of 
support of H, is in fact equal to the posterior probability of H we are looking for. In other 
words, if sp( H) denotes the degree of support of H, then 
p’(H) = sp(ff) 
forall H G R. 
(4) 
As will be shown in this paper, Eq. (4) is an important new result that allows to efficiently 
compute the posterior probability of events in L?. It is a consequence of properties of 
supports of events that are proved in this paper for the first time. But Eq. (4) is not only 
important from a computational perspective, but it is also interesting in itself because it 
establishes in a clear and mathematically precise manner the equivalence between classical 
posterior probabilities on the one hand. and degrees of support (or degrees of belief as 
defined in ATMS and assumption-based reasoning) on the other hand. This equivalence is 
also an interesting contribution of this paper. The following list states some advantages of 
the symbolic, logic-based approach to compute p’(H) that is presented in this paper: 
l a sensitivity analysis of p’(H) with respect to the prior probabilities of the 
components is possible because sp(H) is derived from the logical formula s(H) and 
from the prior probabilities of the components (see below); 
l due to the properties of the supports of events that are established in this paper, it is 
not necessary to recompute everything when the posterior probability of another event 
is needed; 
l the support s(H) of the event H can be viewed as an argument supporting this event. 
This logical formula s(H) can therefore be seen as a symbolic explanation of the 
numerical value p'(H) = sp(H). 
Finally, let us emphasize that our approach also applies to situations where the 
components have any number of possible operating modes (usually it is assumed that there 
are only two possible operating modes: intact and faulty). 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 3 presents a simple and classical example 
that serves as an introduction and preparation for the general theory exposed in Section 4. 
The probabilistic structure is introduced into the model in Section 5. In particular, the case 
of components with more than two possible operating modes (more than one fault state) 
is analyzed. Finally, Appendix A presents a new algorithm for computing probabilities of 
disjunctive normal forms for systems with more than two operating modes; Appendix B 
lists the proofs of the theorems. 
2. Comparison with related work 
In Reiter’s theory [31], the problem is to find the so-called diagnoses: a diagnosis 
is a collection of components whose malfunctioning is sufficient to explain the actual 
observations of the system. In other words, assuming that all components of a diagnosis are 
faulty, the actual observations X0 become compatible with the system description Xs. Of 
course, the components of a diagnosis are natural candidates for replacement, but since in 
general there are many different diagnoses, the problem is then to evaluate their respective 
value in order to reduce their number. In Reiter [31], it is proposed to make additional 
measurements to help discriminate between diagnoses. Discrimination between diagnoses 
is achieved by using more and more information in the form of additional observations, 
which turns the analysis into an incremental process. Using the notion of conflict set, Reiter 
[3 l] also shows that the task of computing diagnoses can essentially be done using theorem 
proving techniques. The attractiveness of Reiter’s approach is that we are provided with 
an explicit list of diagnoses, and therefore of components to replace, at each step of the 
incremental process. However, as shown in Reiter’s paper, the incremental discrimination 
process is not necessarily monotone: an additional observation does not guarantee that the 
new list of diagnoses will be shorter. Unlike ours, Reiter’s approach is purely logical or 
symbolic as there is no numerical or probabilistic aspect involved. 
De Kleer and Williams [ 131 proposed one way of introducing probabilities into 
diagnostics problems. They consider the notion of a candidate, which is defined as a 
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set of components whose malfunctioning makes the observations compatible with the 
system description if it is assumed that the components not in the candidate are working 
correctly. Note that the notion of a candidate is not exactly the same as the notion of a 
diagnosis in Reiter’s paper [31]. Then, de Kleer and Williams [ 131 determine candidates 
and also probabilities of candidates. When there is no candidate having a probability that 
is much higher than the probability of the other candidates, it is necessary to obtain more 
information in order to discriminate between the candidates. This is achieved by observing 
the value of some variable somewhere in the system. Given the new observation, the 
posterior probability of the remaining candidates is then computed according to Bayes’ 
rule. So this is again an incremental process. De Kleer and Williams [13] also show 
how minimal entropy techniques can be used to guide the selection of the variable to be 
observed next. 
Now let us say a few words about the differences between our approach and the one 
proposed by de Kleer and Williams [ 131. First, it can be easily proved that the posterior 
probability of a candidate according to their analysis is in general different from the 
posterior probability of a candidate according to our analysis. This is a consequence of the 
model they are using, which, in order to be able to apply Bayes rule, absolutely requires a 
known conditional distribution of some observable variable given a candidate. The problem 
is that, in most cases, the specification of a candidate does not permit to derive a probability 
distribution on such a variable, but only a belief function in the sense of the theory 
of evidence [33]. So de Kleer and Williams 1131 simply assume a uniform conditional 
distribution in such cases, which in our opinion is a somewhat unjustified step. On the other 
hand, in our theory there is no need for such conditional distributions in order to be able 
to compute the posterior distribution. This is a big advantage over de Kleer and Williams’ 
[13] approach. The point is that our theory naturally remains within the classical theory of 
probability without a need for extraneous assumptions. Also, in our theory, the computation 
of posterior probabilities is not limited to candidates as in de Kleer and Williams’ 1131 
approach: the posterior probability of any event involving components can be computed. 
For example, we can compute the posterior probability that both components c; and cj are 
faulty. 
Our approach is an extension of those of Provan [28] and Laskey and Lehner [25] which 
are restricted to propositional logic. In our theory, only the assumptions about the status of 
the components are represented in propositional logic, but not necessarily the description 
of the system itself. Also, our framework can be used to analyze systems where each 
component has more than the usual two operating modes (intact or faulty). In addition, 
important new properties of the so-called quasi-supports are established. 
Diagnosis problems can also be modeled and analyzed with Bayesian networks. For 
example, Pearl [27] considers the problem of diagnosing a simple input-output arithmetical 
circuit and solves it with Bayesian networks as follows. First, the arithmetical circuit is 
modeled as a causal network. Then it is turned into a Bayesian network by introducing 
link probabilities of a node given its parents (see [27, Eq. (5.54) p. 2651) and by assigning 
prior probabilities to nodes without parents. Prior probabilities must be assigned to two 
different kinds of nodes in the causal network: those corresponding to input variable and 
those corresponding to the components themselves. Since the values of the input variables 
are known it is easy to give a prior probability for them: simply set this probability to 1 at 
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the observed value of the variable and 0 elsewhere. As in our approach, prior probabilities 
are also assigned to nodes corresponding to components of the circuit. In order to have 
a complete Bayesian network, the conditional distribution of the output of a component 
given certain values of its input variables and given its operating status (good or bad) must 
be specified. Then, given the values of the output variables that are observed, the posterior 
probabilities of the nodes corresponding to components of the circuit are computed using 
traditional message propagation algorithms. The result is a mathematical formula giving, 
for each component of the system, the posterior probability that it is faulty. 
The determination of conditional distributions is easy when the component is working 
correctly, but when this is not the case Pearl arbitrarily assumes a uniform conditional 
distribution on the output (regardless of the input values). In our opinion, this arbitrariness 
is a major weak point of the Bayesian network approach. Generally speaking, the 
determination of the conditional distributions is a major problem with Bayesian networks. 
In contrast, with the method presented here, only prior probabilities on the components 
are needed in order to compute posterior probabilities on the components. The effect of 
faulty components is specified in the logical system description in an appropriate way. Our 
approach is therefore based on a more precise and explicit representation of the knowledge 
about the system. As a consequence, the results obtained by Pearl are different from ours. 
It is also interesting to compare the theory developed in this paper with Shenoy’s 
valuation-based systems [34]. When all the variables have a finite number of possible 
values and when the components themselves have a finite number of possible working 
modes, it can be proved that a valuation-based model based on belief functions (Kohlas 
et al. [24]) will give the same posterior probabilities as our approach. However, belief 
functions on variables with infinite domains are not tractable. Moreover, valuation-based 
models do not give the qualitative, symbolic information represented by the support s (H). 
Therefore, the explanation aspect of the diagnosis analysis is again completely absent, it 
is a purely numerical technique. In addition, the computational method presented in this 
paper is completely different from the local propagation algorithm of Shafer-Shenoy [34]. 
The paper of Darwiche [8] considers a model that is very similar to ours. The discussion 
about the differences and similarities between the two approaches is given further down 
in the paper because we need to present our model in more details first. This discussion is 
given at the end of Section 4. 
3. An informal introduction using a simple example 
In this section we introduce informally our approach to model-based diagnostics. For 
that purpose we discuss a simple example of a faulty arithmetical network. The example 
has been introduced by Davis [9] and subsequently used in many papers on model-based 
diagnostics (e.g., Reiter [31] and de Kleer and Williams [ 131). The aim of this informal 
introduction is to illustrate and clarify the technique of model-based diagnostics and to 
motivate our formal approach presented in Section 4 and Section 5. 
Example 1. Fig. 1 shows a network consisting of three multipliers and two adders. The 
network has six input and two output ports. Obviously, the given input and the observed 
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Fig. I. A network with three multiplim and two adders. 
output values as stated in Fig. 1 do not correspond to an intact network. One or several 
components must therefore be faulty. The problem is to locate and replace the faulty 
component(s). 
The key point of model-based diagnostics is to formulate a descriptive model of the 
entire system. The model will then be used to solve the diagnosis problem. First, the 
components of the system have to be modeled. Components like adders and multipliers 
can be described by specifications of the form 
(adder(X) A Y&X)) + [out(X) = ini + in*(X)], 
(multiplier(X) A 4(X)) -+ [our(X) = in1 (X) *+22(X)]. 
Note the presence of the ab-predicate. It denotes abnormal (faulty) behavior of a 
component. In the specifications above it is not explicitly stated how a faulty adder or 
multiplier behaves; this means that a faulty component may return any result, including the 
correct one. Other assumptions are possible, e.g., a faulty component may never give the 
correct result, or always returns the negative of its correct result, or just discards negative 
signs, etc. 
The second part of the model is to describe the system topology. The network topology 
as shown in Fig. 1 is modeled by listing the components present in the network 
multipliedm I)? multiplier(m2). multiplier( 
udder(al), udder(u2), 
and by listing the connections between the input and output ports of the components, 
namely 
out(ml) = inI (al). out(m2) = h(ul). 
out(m2) = inI (a~). out (m3) = in2(u2). 
Finally, the model is completed by adding the observed input and output values. For the 
present example we have 
inI (InI) = 3. in2(r?zt) = 2. i/Z[ (ml) = 3. in2(m2) = 2, 
irzt (ml) = 3, irQ(m&-i) = 2. out(a)) = IO. 0Uf(U~) = 12 
As mentioned before, it is obvious that the output values do not correspond to the values 
predicted from the given input values. The above model can now help to identify the faulty 
component(s) of the system. 
In the following an informal analysis of the situation will be performed. First, suppose 
that only the system description is given, but no observations are available yet. The 
system contains five components ct = nz 1, ~‘2 = tnz, (‘3 = ~23, (‘4 = al, ~5 = 122. To each 
component C, we associate a Boolean variable x; that indicates whether the component 
is intact (x; = 1) or faulty (x, = 0). A Boolean vector .r = (xt .x2.. .x5) describes 
one of the 2’ possible system states. Examples of such states are x = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (all 
components are intact), x = (0. 0, 0. 0, 0) (all components are faulty), or x = (0. 1, 1. I, I ) 
(component ~7 1 is faulty, all other components are intact). 
Now suppose that the above observations are made. For such a particular situation many 
system states x become impossible and must be excluded. An example of such a state is 
.Y = ( I, I. I. 1. I). since at least one component must be faulty. More generally, all states 
x for which xt = .YZ = -1-4 = 1 are impossible, since it is not possible that m 1, rnz, and CI~ 
are all intact. In Reiter’s framework of model-based diagnostics the set of components 
(~7 1, m?, ~71) is called minimal conflict set. Another minimal conflict set for the given 
situation is (rn1.77~3, L~~,cQ) and all states x for which .\I = .rj = xq = x5 = 1 must be 
excluded as well. 
Given the observations, the state space (0, 1)” decomposes into two disjoint sets, the set 
N,/ of possible states and the set N,. of impossible states. Any state x E Nd is a possible 
explanation of the observations, i.e.. a possible “diagnosis” of the system behavior. On the 
other hand, any state x E N,. is in conflict with the observations and is called a “conflict” 
or a “contradictory” state. One of the main problems of our approach is to identify and 
represent he state sets NC/ and N,. Note that the size of the state space grows exponentially 
with the number of components contained in the system. For a system with a moderately 
large number of components, it will therefore not be feasible to represent NC/ and N,, by 
explicit lists of system states. 
However, consider the propositional language over the propositions ab(c,). System 
states are interpretations of these propositions in the sense of propositional logic: under the 
interpretation x, the proposition uh(c;) evaluates to “true” ifx, = 0, and to “false” if x; = 1. 
Each formula ,f of this language can then be evaluated in the usual way for a given system 
state. Any formula .f’ defines the set N(f’) of all interpretations .L’ for which the formula 
,J evaluates to true under s. Therefore, sets like NC1 and N,. can be represented efficiently 
by corresponding propositional formulas d and c’ with N,/ = N(cl) and N,. = N(C). For the 
above example we get 
(‘zz (-Llh(n7,) A -ah(m2) A “~~(~I)) 
v (-uh(rn , ) A -ab(mj ) A -ah(u, ) A Yzh(u2)). 
Li = ab(m, ) v Llh(U, ) v (d@Q) A d,(rnj)) v (Lzh(rn?) A uh(a2)). 
(5) 
(6) 
The key point in Reiter’s framework of model-based diagnostics are the concepts of 
minimal conflict sets and diagnoses. Note, that minimal conflict sets and diagnoses 
correspond essentially to our idea of logical representations of possible and impossible 
states. For example, every conjunction in (6) is a diagnosis in Reiter’s sense. The main 
question treated by Reiter’s theory is how to find conflict sets and diagnoses. In this paper 
we use some of Reiter’s results to find the logical representations c and d (see Section 4). 
Knowing the diagnoses of a faulty system does not always allow us to locate precisely 
the faulty component(s). For example, in (6) there are four diagnoses, two of them 
consisting of only one faulty component and two consisting of two faulty components. 
If we assume high component reliabilities, then diagnoses stating that only one component 
is faulty are more likely. In our example the faulty component will therefore probably be 
either ml or at although the other possibilities can not be excluded. Reiter’s framework 
does not permit a further investigation in order to discriminate between TV 1 and u) 
In our approach of possible and impossible system states we can investigate such cases 
more precisely. If Ni denotes the set of all states x with _x; = 0. then N, represents the 
event that c; is faulty. Given the observations, elements .r E N; n N,l can then be seen as 
arguments in favor of the hypothesis that component C; is faulty. Furthermore, if mutually 
independent prior probabilities p, are given. stating that a component c, is intact at any 
given time, then it is possible to evaluate hypotheses of the form “component c; is faulty“ 
numerically by computing the posterior probability of N; given N‘I. For example, if we 
assume p) = p2 = 173 = 0.95 for multipliers and pi = 1)s = 0.98 for adders, then each 
system state x gets a well defined prior probability given by ( 1). 
Knowing that the actual system state is in N,i changes the initial probability to the 
conditional probability according to (2). Now, we may be interested in the event that a 
particular component c; is faulty. Then. according to (2) we get the following results for 
the present example (remember that N; represents the event that component c; is faulty): 
$(N,) = 0.69. p’(N2) = 0.09. /,‘(Nj) = 0.08. /7’(N1) = 0.27. I)‘(&) = 0.03. 
The given situation can now be judged more precisely: component (‘1 (i.e., multiplier m 1) 
has by far the highest failure probability and should therefore be replaced first. If after 
replacing component m 1 the system is still working abnormally, then -ab(m 1) must be 
added to the system description (since the new component n? 1 can be assumed to be intact), 
and the model has to be reevaluated. 
In case the above method does not help to discriminate between two or more 
components, it may be possible to use the same analysis to select the most informative 
additional measurements and to redo the computations according to the new observations. 
This is not discussed in this paper. 
4. The formal model 
In this section we follow as far as possible Reiter’s [3 I] framework and use also concepts 
and results from de Kleer et al. [ 1 I]. We adapt the formalism slightly in order get a direct 
way to introduce a probabilistic structure into the model in the next section. 
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4.1. Basic dejinitions 
It is assumed that the system and also the observations about the system behavior are 
described in some language C which contains in particular the unary predicate ah(c). 
Another requirement of the language and the logic behind it will be specified below. 
Otherwise, the language C can be very general as long as it has a clear and sound semantics. 
Note that the language of first-order logic, for example, satisfies all of our needs, but other 
languages are possible as well. 
The system is supposed to be composed of a set C = {c I. . , c,} of components and the 
predicate ah(c) holds if the component c E C is faulty (i.e., c behaves abnormally). It is not 
excluded that several components of the system are working abnormally. Let x denote a 
Boolean vector (xl, . . , x,) whose component xi describes whether component ci is intact 
(xi = 1) or faulty (xi = 0). Such a vector x is called a system state. Define ah(c)’ as the 
literal ah(c) if e = 0 and -u&c) if e = 1. Then a state x can also be logically represented 
by the conjunction c(x) = A{u~(c;)-‘~: i = 1, . , n}. 
Let now S denote the propositional language generated by the propositions ab(ct ), , 
ub(cn) and assume that S E C. Formulas in S are statements representing a subset of all 
system states. The set of all system states can be seen as a set of interpretations for the 
formulas in S (ab(ci) evaluates to true under x if xi = 0). If a formula f E S evaluates to 
trueunderxwewritex~,f.Ifx+~t,x+,~2 ,..., x/=,.fmwewritex+f’t . . . . . fm.As 
before, we define N(f) = (x: x l= ,f), a subset of the state space B, = {O. 1)“. Note that 
the following properties hold for the sets N (,f ) : 
N(f A g) = N(f) n N(g). N(f v g) = N(f) U N(R), 
N(-f) = N(f)“. N(f) C N(g) iff .f I= R. 
(7) 
A conjunction co of literals of ab(ci)’ is called an implicant of a formula f E S if 
co + f; it is called a prime implicant if no proper subconjunction of co is an implicant 
of ,f. If dl , . . , d, are the prime implicants of ,f, then it is well known that dl v . v drI, 
is logically equivalent to f. We denote logical equivalence by the equality sign “=“. Thus 
,f = dl v . v dm and the right-hand side is called the disjunctive normal form (DNF) of 
f. ’ A clause cl (that is a disjunction of literals of ah(c;)) is called an implicate of f’ if 
.f’ + cl; it is called a prime implicate if no proper subclause of cl is an implicate of f. If 
gt , . , gr are the prime implicates of f, then f’ = gl A . A g, and the right-hand side 
is called the conjunctive normal form (CNF) of ,f. 2 These normal forms are convenient 
representations of propositional formulas. 
Now we need to include in the formalism the fact that if some components are assumed 
to be intact and the others faulty then the system is in contradiction with the observations. 
So let X E C be a set of sentences or formulas of the language C representing the behavior 
of the system and the observations. Note that the sentences in X normally contain one 
or several predicates ah(ci) because the behavior of the component ci depends on its state 
’ In general, any disjunction of conjunctions which is equivalent to f is called a DNF; in contrast here we 
understand by a DNF of ,f’ only a disjunctive normal form whose conjunctions are prime implicants. Note that 
with this definition there are in general more than one DNF of f. 
2 Footnote I applies. respectively, also to CNFs and prime implicates. 
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(intact or faulty). Given a system state x-which is equivalent to specify what are the intact 
and faulty components-we can evaluate to true or false all occurrences of the predicate 
ah(ci ) appearing in formula f in X. In this case we say that ,f E X is instantiated by x and 
we write fx. 
Given a system state x E B,, we suppose thut there is a mechanism thatpermits to decide 
if the .set qf instantiated formulas (,f\ : ,f E X} ‘. IT consistent or not. We refer to Section 3 
for an illustration. 
If it is inconsistent, then the system state x is in conflict with the available information 
represented by X and we write X. c(x) =+ 1. So it becomes possible to determine the 
system states that are in conflict with X and those that are compatible with it. If x 
is compatible with X, i.e., x is not in contradiction with X, we write X, c(x) + 1. 
More generally, if fl, . . . fr are formulas in the propositional language S, then we 
write X. ft , . . , f( =+ _L if X, c(x) j I for every x such that x + fl. . . , Jr. Note 
that if f’) , . . , ,fy are not satisfiable (in the sense of propositional logic) then trivially 
X. f’l . . . fs =+ 1. For obvious reasons, if X, j‘l , , f,. -h + i for some propositional 
formulas fl , . , j,,hES,thenwewriteX.ft ,..., fy=+h. 
Lemma 1. For ,f, h E S 
X. f =+ h ifand only if X, c(x) =+ h whenet’er x /= f’. 
(The proofs of the theorems and lemmas can be found in Appendix B .) 
Given a system, let Xs E C be a set of sentences describing the behavior of the 
system through the relations among its components and let X0 G C be a set of sentences 
representing the observations. Together this gives XSO = Xs U X0 which is the available 
information. In general, there is another set of formulas C C S representing some 
knowledge about the possible system states. For example, in systems with components 
having different failure modes, there are formulas stating that each component is either 
operating correctly or is in exactly one of its failure modes. Then the set of formulas 
XsYY = X.so U C in C represents all available information about the system. 
4.2. Conflict 
The set NC = (.x E B, : XTys, c(x) + I] is called the set of conflict states. On the other 
hand N,i = {x E B,: XSyS. c(x) + -L} = N: is the set of possible states or diagnoses 
(using the terminology of de Kleer et al. [ 121). The formula 
corzt = 
v dx) (8) 
iEN, 
is called conflict or contradiction. More precisely, any formula in S that is logically 
equivalent to cant is called the conflict, for example, its DNFs dcl v . . v dc, where 
dcl. . . , dc, are all prime implicants of cont. A conjunction co of literals of ab(ci) is 
called a conflict set (or a contradiction set) if X,,,. co =+ 1. The following lemma is 
inspired by 1121 and shows that conflict sets and implicants of cant are the same. 
Lemma 2. A conjunction co is a conflict set if and only if co is an implicant oj’cont. 
This lemma implies that the prime implicants &, of cmt are the minimal conflict sets. 
Since X,,~,Y,dcj + 1. which is the same as X,,,$ =+ --&i, the clauses ~ici would be 
called “prime implicates” of X,YY,Y. Indeed, if C was a propositional language, the clauses 
“dcj would be real prime implicates. 
More generally, a formula ,f’ E S is called a conflicting argument or a contradictory 
argument if 
Lemma 3. The jbrnuda cant is the weukest cotztradictot?; urgumerzt, i.e.: 
(1) X,sV.s, cant =+ 1. 
(2) [f ,f is a contrrrdicto~ argument, then ,f b cont. 
Obviously, this lemma implies that cant is the only weakest contradictory argument (up 
to logical equivalence). 
The conflict, the conflict sets and in particular the minimal ones, play a central role in the 
theories of diagnostics from first principles. as has been clearly shown by Reiter 13 I] and 
de Kleer et al. [ 121 and many other authors. Note that the notions of conflict and conflict 
sets are defined differently in [ 12,3 11. Our definition of a conflict set as a conjunction of 
c&c;)-literals corresponds to Reiter’s [31] notion of a conflict set. In contrast, de Kleer et 
al. 1121 use clauses of U&C; )-literals for the same purpose and call them conflicts. In our 
paper, a conflict is a logical description of the conflict states N,.. 
In fact it is almost always proposed to first compute the minimal conflict sets from 
the system description and the observations and then to derive from them all kinds of 
diagnostic concepts. For example. from the minimal conflict sets dcl . , dc,, the DNF 
corzt = dc, v . v dc,,, 
is considered and the prime implicants of -cant are called kernel diagnoses by de Kleer et 
al. [12]. 
The method for computing the conflict sets depends on the particular language or logic 
used to describe the system and the observations. If, for example, the system and the 
observations are described in propositional logic, then resolution methods can be applied to 
obtain all prime implicates of X,V,., (not only those in S). Then using results of Reiter and 
de Kleer [32] the minimal conflicts can be extracted from them. More efficient methods 
based on the concept of production fields are possible [ 19,22.35). These approaches apply 
for example to the diagnostics of digital circuits [3 1. 
Often systems are built from components which can be described by input-output 
relations between variables. Observations are then usually obtained by measuring the 
values of some variables. In such cases assumption-based constraint propagation can 
be used to obtain the conflict sets [ 13,151. This approach has been implemented in 
ABEL’ [2,4], which is a general modeling language for assumption-based reasoning 
under uncertainty. 
’ The wurce code ol’ an lmplementarion of ABEL is freely available from http : / /www2 - iiuf uni fr 
ch/tcs:abel/. 
4.3. Quasi-support 
The conflict sets are also fundamental for the theory to be developed here. In the first 
place they provide a convenient representation of the set of conflict states N,. and thereby. 
implicitly, also for its complement, the set of diagnoses ,Y,/. 
But there is more. A formula h E S can be considered as a hypothesis about the 
correct but unknown system state. Given X,Y,,, it is then interesting to ask whether there 
are arguments supporting I2 or arguments rejecting /I. .4n argument supporting h is an 
assumption about the state of certain components, represented by a formula ,f‘ E S such 
that 
x,s,,y. .f =+ h. 
For II E S let 
Q(h) = {x E B,: XsJs, c(x) =+ h} 
(9) 
(IO) 
and define the quasi-support of h as 
c/s(h) = v c(x). 
.I EC)(hl 
(11) 
Lemma 4. For e\,ery h E S, qs(h) is the weakest argument supporting II, i.e. : 
(1) &s> v(h) =+ k 
(2) {f ,f is a supporting argumentfor h, then f’ + qs(h). 
It follows from this lemma that there is only one weakest argument supporting a 
hypothesis h (up to logical equivalence). 
By definition, a contradictory argument is an argument supporting 1. By Lemma 3, c’otzt 
is the weakest contradictory argument and hence also the weakest argument supporting 1. 
But then by Lemma 4 it follows that 
cant = qs(-!-) 
which in turn implies that 
N(qs(.l)) = N(cont) = N,.. 
More generally. we have the following result: 
(12) 
(I?) 
Lemma 5. For e\!ery h E S: 
(1) N(qs(h)) = Q(h), 
(2) p(l) + qs(h). 
The quasi-support of h is a support of h because it is an argument of h but not a proper 
support of h since qs(l_) b qs(h) and qs(l) is a contradictory argument. This is why LIS(~) 
is only a quasi-support of h. Proper supports will be considered below. 
The following theorem is the basic result of the theory developed in this paper. 
Theorem 6. For every h E S: 
N(qs(h)) = N(h) u N,.. (14) 
It has the following important corollary: 
Corollary 7. For every h E S: 
qs(h) = h v qs(l). (15) 
Since qs(l-) = cant and cent is determined by the minimal conflict sets, Corollary 7 
implies that q&s(h) is also determined by the minimal conflict sets. This underlines once 
more the importance of the conflict sets for the theory of diagnostics from first principles. 
The full importance of ( 15) will become clear in the following Section 5 where probability 
calculations are made. 
Once qs(_L) is given, for example, by the disjunction of all minimal conflict sets, 
the prime implicants dhl . . . . , dh, of qs(h) may be computed by standard methods 
of propositional logic. This determines then the DNF qs(h) = dhl v ..’ v dh,. The 
conjunctions dh, are called minimal quasi-support sets of I?. They provide a convenient 
representation of q”(h). Note that the minimal quasi-support sets of I are the minimal 
conflict sets. 
Example 2. Let is illustrate these notions and results by continuing the example of the 
arithmetical network of Fig. 1 discussed in Section 3. As mentioned before there are two 
minimal conflict sets and therefore we have 
qs(-!-) = (-ub(m,) A “Ub(rn~) A -ub(ul)) 
v (-ab(tn,) A -ub(tns) A “Ub(lll) A -ab(uz)). 
Suppose now that we are interested in the hypothesis that m 1 is intact, i.e., h = --ab(m I). 
Then. by Corollary 7, qs(--nh(rn I)) = -ab(tn 1) v p(l) = -ab(m 1). On the other hand, 
for example, q.s(-ch(tt72)) = ,-ub(mz) v (-ub(tni) A -ub(u~) A -ub(tnj) A -ub(uz)). 
Section 5 will show how these logical expressions can be used to compute posterior 
probabilities for the corresponding hypotheses. 
The following theorem gives further remarkable properties of quasi-support. 
Theorem 8. For nttj’ 17 I, 172 E S: 
q.s(l?, A h?) = q.s(h, ) A qs(hz). 
qs(h, v h7) = qs(h I ) v qs(hz). 
y’T denotes the tuutology, dlrtt 
qs(T) = T. 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
This result links this theory of diagnostics to a more genera1 theory. In a more general 
setting where h belongs to a first propositional language ‘II (the language of hypotheses) 
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and the image qs(h) to another, second propositional language A (the language of 
assumptions), and for which (16) and (18) (but not necessarily ( 17)) are satisfied, qs(h) 
is called an allocation of support [20,21]. If probabilities are given to the assumptions, 
then the probabilities of the formulas qs(h) define a belief (or support) function on the 
set of hypotheses h in ‘FI in the sense of Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence [20,21,33]. 
This is an approach to the Dempster-Shafer theory that goes along similar lines as the one 
proposed by Provan [28]. 
A more explicit discussion of the relations and links between model-based diagnosis and 
the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence can be found in 13,241. 
Theorem 8 implies that qs(h v II”) = 9s(h) v qs(h”) and this shows that qs is a so- 
called additive allocation of support. For additive allocations of support it can be shown 
that the induced belief functions are Bayesian [20,33]. Since Bayesian belief functions are 
mathematically equivalent to ordinary probability measures, the results given in Section 5 
are expressed in probabilistic terms. 
4.4. Supp0l.t 
A formula f E S is called a proper argument of h if f is an argument for h but f is 
not a contradictory argument, i.e.. if 
(1) x,,.,. f’=+ h, 
(2) x,.,,. f k 1. 
The following lemma implies that the second condition saying that ,f is not a 
contradictory argument is the same as saying that f does not entail the conflict cont. 
Lemma 9. 
.f I= cant if and only $ X,.,y, ,f + 1. (19) 
For h E S, define 
s(h) = q”(h) A -qs(l). 
The following lemma says that s(h) is a proper argument of h 
cm 
Lemma 10. !f .s(h) # I therz s(h) is a proper argument of h. 
Corollary 7 implies the following result: 
Corollary 11. Fbr eve? ,f c S: 
.S(I?) = h A -qs(l). (21) 
This result in turn implies that N(s(h)) = N(h) n NC,. This means that s(h) represents 
the set of all possible system states (i.e., all diagnoses) which prove the hypothesis h, i.e., 
all possible system states that logically entail h. This is the reason why the proper argument 
.s(l7 ) is called the support of h. 
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Once again, as shown in Eq. (2 l), the support can be easily determined from the conflict 
qs(l). Also, note that s(l) = 1. 
At this point, we are ready to see how our theory relates with the ideas and results 
presented in Darwiche [S]. He considers a system which is a tuple (A, P. A. 4) where 
A is a database containing formulas in the language CA+,U generated by the atoms in 
P U A and r$ is a formula in the language Lp generated by the atoms in P. He calls the 
atoms in A assumables and those in P non-assumables. The interpretation of these items 
is that the database describes the system’s behavior, the assumables represent the mode 
of the system components (working or not) and the formula 4 represents the observed 
system behavior. Then he explains what is a diagnosis of a system and defines what is 
the consequence of an observation 4. If CA denotes the language generated by the atoms 
in A, then the consequence of an observation Q, E Cr, written Cons($), is the strongest 
formula (;Y E CA such that A U (@} b a. This allows him to characterize all diagnoses in 
terms of Cons(d). For two observations $1 and $JZ in Cp. it is mentioned in the paper 
that 
Cons(~l v 42) = ConLs(g51) v Cons(&). (22) 
He also defines the argument for 4, writtenArg(@), which is defined as the weakest formula 
cr E LA such that A U (a) k 4, and mentions that 
Arg(g5) = -Con.s(-4). (23) 
In Darwiche’s paper, the goal of the diagnosis analysis is then to identify a so-called most 
preferred diagnosis. To reach this goal, the paper gives an algorithm for the computation 
of CtWrs(~). 
How does this relate with our theory? First of all it is important to notice that his 
definition of a diagnosis corresponds exactly to our definition. Moreover, his concept of 
a system can be placed into our theory. Indeed, we just have to set S := CA, c := CA+p, 
Xx := A and X0 := (4). However, our model is more general than the one of Darwiche [X] 
because our description of the system behavior and the observation must not necessarily 
be expressed in propositional logic. For example, in the arithmetical network of Fig. 1, it 
would be hard to describe the observations in propositional logic, which must be the case 
in the system of Darwiche. 
Now suppose that the system (A, P, A, 4) is placed into our framework as described 
above. In this paper, we have defined the function 
q.r:c/, -+ CA. (24) 
Since this function depends on the system description A and the observations 4, it could 
be written @A”(,&} instead of just qs. 
On the other hand. Darwiche defines the function 
c0n.S : cp + CA. (2.5) 
So, in spite of their similarity, the properties (17) and (22) are completely different because 
( 17) is a property of hypotheses h E CA and (22) is a property of observations $ E cp. The 
same remark holds true with respect to the property (16) and the property 
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(26) @(+I A Gp2) =Arg(h) AAI;d4zj 
for all $1.42 in Cp. To the best of our knowledge, Theorem 8 is a new result. 
However. we have the following interesting relations: 
coI1.s(~~ - “cp&J{@) (Il. (27) 
AvJ(@) = y.~~u~-~~(U. (28j 
In the next section it is explained how the conflict $sAU(,$,) (L) can be used to compute 
the posterior probability of some hypothesis of interest h in CA. The development assumes 
that the conflict has already been determined by some method (see above). In view of 
Eq. (27). the algorithm presented in the article of Darwiche to compute Cons(@) can be 
used to find the conflict: 
qsA”(@) (-I_) = -Cms(a,). (29) 
This shows that Darwiche’s paper can be useful for our theory, but the goals of the two 
papers are different: he wants to identify the most preferred diagnosis whereas we want to 
evaluate interesting hypotheses about the system. 
Example 3. Once again we use the arithmetical network of Fig. 1 to illustrate the concept 
of support. According to Section 3 we have 
-ys(l_) -- ah(ml) VUh(0l) v (ab(r?zz) A Ub(rn~)) V (ah(m2) A ah(a2)). (30) 
Then from Corollary 11 we obtain 
.s(uh(m,)) =ah(m,), 
.s(ah(m~)) = Uh(?72~) A ( ~17 ml vuh(nl) vub(m3) vab(a2)). I ( > 
.s(ab(iwj)) = ah(ms) A (nh(ml) v dqnl) v ab(nz~)), 
s(ab(u,)) = ab(u]), 
s(ah(uz)) = ub(m) A (nh(m I) v ab(a1) v u&Q)‘). 
5. Numerical evaluation of hypotheses 
Once the probabilities of the system states are defined, the probability of any hypothesis 
h E S about the system one might want to consider can be computed. The model starts 
with prior probabilities on the possible system states before any observation is made. 
Observations on the system reduces then in general the set of possible states. The prior 
probabilities must correspondingly be conditioned on the new set of possible states to 
obtain posterior probabilities as has already been exemplified in the introductory example 
of Section 3. 
This probabilistic framework is very simple. The real problem is the computation 
of these conditional probabilities for various hypotheses. The computational problem 
is similar to the problems encountered in combinatorial reliability theory. Appropriate 
methods may be borrowed from this field and adapted to the present situation. 
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5.1. Components with one failure mode 
In the simplest case the system is composed of independently failing components where 
each component can only be in one of two different states: functioning or faulty. The ith 
component xi of the system state x indicates in this case simply whether the component 
is intact (xi = 1) or faulty (xi = 0). The probability model is then based on the sample 
space Bn, i.e., the state space of the system, and the probability on this space is defined 
by the probabilities p(x) of the sample points or states. If pi is the (prior) probability that 
the ith component is intact (at a given point in time), and if the failures of components are 
assumed to be stochastically independent, then 
n 
P(X) = l-I p:’ (1 - p;)(‘-x’). (31) 
i=l 
The probability of any event A g B,, can in principle be obtained as the sum of these 
elementary probabilities over the sample points which make the event, 
P(A) = c p(x). 
XEA 
(32) 
For any hypothesis h E S its prior probability p(N(h)) can now be calculated. 
Now, if observations on the system restrict the possible states to the set Nd C B, of 
diagnoses, then this means that the prior probabilities p(x) must be conditioned on the 
event Nd to get the posterior probabilities 
P(X) 
p’(x) = - 
P(Nd) ’ 
with p(Nd) = c p(x). 
XENd 
The posterior probability of an event A E B, is then given by 
P’(A) = 
P(A n Nd) 
P(Nd) . 
(33) 
(34) 
Given the observations, the posterior probability of the hypothesis h is then p’( N(h)). In 
order to simplify notation we write p’(h) instead of p’(N(h)) for any formula h E S. Thus 
for all h E S: 
p,(h) = PW@) n Nd) 
P(Nd) = c P’(X) xeN(h)nNd (35) 
The posterior probability p’(h) expresses the chance that hypothesis h is true. It can easily 
be proved that s : S --f S given by s(h) = qs(h) A -qs(_L) is an additive allocation of 
support because so is the function qs : S + S (see Section 4). Since the function 
p”(X) = 
P(x)/P(Nd) if’x E Nd, 
0 otherwise 
(36) 
is a probability measure on B,,, it follows from the general theory of allocations of 
support [20] that the induced belief (or support) function sp : S + [0, l] given by sp(h) = 
p”(N(s(h)) is a Bayesian belief function, i.e., a probability measure on S. The following 
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theorem shows that the degree of belief, or more in the spirit of this paper, the degree of 
support of a hypothesis h expressed by sp(h) is the same as the posterior probability of h 
given by p’(h). 
Theorem 12. For every hypothesis h E S: 
sp(h) = p’(h). (37) 
This means that the chance or likelihood of h being true, namely p’(h), can be viewed as 
the strength with which the support s(h) actually supports h. This shows that the posterior 
probabilities of hypothesis are nothing but weights of arguments when the analysis is 
placed in the context of Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. This is a fairly convincing 
way to judge and evaluate hypotheses. 
The real problem is the computation of sums as in (33) and (35) because of the large 
number of terms these sums may contain. In fact, if the system consists of n components, 
then the expected number of terms in those sums is of the order of 2”. The computation 
of such sums becomes quickly infeasible. Therefore, better methods must be found for the 
computation of the posterior probabilities p’(h). This problem will be addressed in the 
next subsection. 
5.2. Computation ofposteriorprobabilities 
First note that there is an alternative formula for a probability like p’(h): 
p’(h) = 
p(N(h) n Nd) = p(N(h) u Nc) - p(Nc) 
P(h) 1 - p(Nc) 
,4&h)) - p(qsU-)I 
1 -PM-u) . 
(38) 
This last expression is convenient for computational purposes. We consider first the 
computation of p(qs(l.)). 
It is supposed that qs(l) is given in the disjunctive normal form qs(_L) = dcl v . . v dc,, 
where the dcj are the minimal conflict sets as explained in Section 4. Since p(Vdcj) = 
p(U N(dcj)) it f o 11 ows that p(qs(_L)) is in fact the probability of a union of events (or the 
probability of a disjunction of formulas, if we use the logical language, as we will do in 
the sequel). This is a classical problem of probability theory which has been much studied, 
especially in combinatorial reliability theory. 
A first and simple approach is given by the so-called inclusion-exclusion formula [ 141: 
p(qs(i))=p(dclv.+dc,)= c (-J)‘r’+lp 
c 1 
Adci . (39) 
rn#I~(l,...,m) iEI 
Note that ~\i~, dci is still a conjunction. The probabilities of conjunctions can easily be 
calculated when components are assumed to fail independently. In fact, if AiEl dc; = 
A kcK ab(ck) l\hEH(Yab(ch)). then 
= n(l -pk) n ph. 
kEK h E H 
(40) 
Since the number of terms in the sum (39) grows exponentially with the number of 
minimal conflict sets m, the computational effort needed for the sum can quickly become 
prohibitive. 
An alternative method, which is often superior to the inclusion-exclusion method, 
consists in transforming the disjunctive form qs(_L) = dcl v v dcc,, into a disjoint form 
qs(l) = .fl + + j;.. with ,fi ji = I whenever i # ,j. (ill) 
Here we denote the disjunction of disjoint terms by a + and the conjunctions of terms by 
a product. Disjoint terms ,fj correspond to disjoint sets N (,f, ) and therefore 
Y(W)) = i P(,fj 1. (42) 
The number of terms in such a sum is often much smaller than the number of terms in (39). 
NOW arises however the problem of finding such a disjoint representation of qs(l_) 
from its DNF dcl V . v dc,?*. In addition, the disjoint form must be such that the 
probabilities of its terms are easy to compute. Several methods for this problem have been 
developed in reliability theory, however for so-called monotone Boolean functions only 
161. This monotonicity property does not hold in general in the present context. Fortunately, 
however, at least two of the best methods can be adapted to the present more general case. 
The first one is due to Abraham [l]. See Chapter 5 of 1231 for its adaptation to our 
situation. In this method qs(l) is developed into disjoint conjunctions ,fj of literals of 
a&c;). So the probabilities p(fj) are easily computed by (40), but this method still tends 
to yield a relatively large number of terms. Therefore, Heidtmann [ 181 proposed a different, 
although more complex method which, in most cases, gives less terms. In his method, a 
f; is a conjunction of one conjunction of literals and a certain number of negations of 
conjunctions of literals. In addition, the factors in ,fj are independent. The probability 
of a factor in fi is easily calculated by (40) (for the negations, the complement to I of 
the probability of the conjunction has to be taken). Then the probability of j’i is simply 
the product of these factor probabilities. For an adaptation of Heidtmann’s method to the 
present more general case see [7]. 
Once the (prior) probability of the conflict p(qs(i)) j i\ computed, Formula (38) can be 
applied to obtain p’(h) for a hypothesis h E S. For this purpose p(qs(h)) = p(h V qs(l)) 
has to be computed. Sometimes qs(h) is already a very simple formula and it is easy 
to obtain its probability. Otherwise, if h is a simple con.junction of literals of m&c;), in 
particular if h = ab(cj ) or h = -ab(c,), p(qs(h)) can be obtained by computing p(h) and 
using the formula ~(h v qs(i)) = p(h) + p(qs(l)) - p(h A p(i)). If qs(l) is already 
in disjoint form ,f] + . . + fr, then h A qs(l_) = hf; + + 1z.f; is still a disjoint form, 
and if the fi are conjunctions of literals of ab(c;), then so are the hf;. So ~(h A rl.s(l)) can 
be computed from this disjoint form. In the general case, h has first to be represented as 
aDNFh=hl v... V ht and then q.y(h) = h V q,v(_L) = (h [ V . V h,) V (f’l f f j;-, 
has to be further developed into a disjoint form by the generalized methods of Abraham or 
Heidtmann. 
Example 4. In the arithmetical network of Fig. 1 Abraham’s method applied to cent as 
given in disjunctive form in Section 4 yields 
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q(l) = (-ub(m 1) A -“ab(m;?) A -ab(u ] ,) 
+ (-ab(m I) A -ub(ul) A “Uh(rn3) A Yzh(U~) A ub(m)). 
Suppose now that a priori multipliers are working correctly with probability 0.95 and 
adders are working correctly with probability 0.98. Then it follows that 
[+&Y(l)) = 0.95* .0.98 + 0.95* o.982 .0.05 = 0.!)28. 
Let us now consider the hypothesis that the multiplier ml is working correctly, i.e., 
h = -ub(m)). We have seen in Section 4 that qst--a&ml )) = -ub(mt ) and hence 
p(qs(-ah(m)))) = 0.95. It follows that 
[I’(“ub(nrr)) = 
p(--ubhl)) - p(qs(U) 0.95 - 0.928 
= __ 
___ =0.31. 
1 - p(qs(l)) 1 - 0.928 
In the same way we can compute the posterior probabilities 
/I’(“ub(nzz)) = 0.91, 
p’(-ub(nq)) = 0.92, 
p’(Yzb(a,)) = 0.73, 
p’(-ub(a2)) = 0.97. 
This is how the numerical results in Section 3 have been computed. Since p’ is a probability 
measure. p’(-h) = 1 - p’(h) and hence the most probable candidate for a fault is 
multiplier fn 1 according to these results. 
Note that the probabilities of faulty components, the complements of the above five 
probabilities, add up to more than 1. The reason is that there can be more than one 
faulty component. In other words, the events ub(mr), ub(mz). ab(ms), ub(ul), and 
ub(q) are not exclusive and hence the probability of conjunctions of such events can 
be positive. In fact, if for example it turns out that adder a2 is faulty (although this 
is relatively unlikely according to the above probabilities), then this is not sufficient to 
explain the observations: there must be at least one other faulty component. So these five 
probabilities alone do not tell the whole story and other, composite hypotheses should be 
considered. But these probabilities do help to focus the search for faulty components to be 
replaced. 
This gives then a method for computing posterior probabilities, given observations 
of the system behavior, in the simple model of independently failing components with 
two states (intact or faulty). As can be seen, the crucial point is the probability of the 
conflict. This is a further illustration of the central role this notion plays in model-based 
diagnostics. In the next section it is shown that the method can be adapted to a more general 
situation. 
5.3. Components with several failure modes 
Besides the simple model of independently failing components with two states 
introduced in Section 5.1, there is another important and interesting model to be considered 
in this section. As before it is assumed that the system is composed of components c‘,, 
i = l,.... IZ. But now some components may also possess more than only one failure 
mode. 
In order to include such a system into the formalism of Section 4, let the predicate mj (ci) 
indicate that the component c; is in mode ,j. Usually, m 1 (ci) designates the normal mode 
of component ci, whereas m,j (ci) for 2 < j < Yj will refer to its failure modes. 
Before generalizing to several failure modes, we reconsider the situation with one failure 
mode from another perspective which is useful to understand the generalization. The state 
space considered there was B,t and the predicates ab(ci) and -ab(ci) were used to denote 
the two possible states of a component. An alternative way is to introduce predicates m 1 (c;) 
and mz(ci) to represent the same information (m 1 (c;) means that ci is intact, mz(c;) that 
ci is faulty and r; = 2 for all i). Then we have to state explicitly that the component c; is 
in exactly one of these two modes, i.e., 
HZ] (Ci) V WZ2(C;). -(ml(c;) Amz(c.;)). (43) 
Instead of the state space B,, we must now consider the larger space BzT1. A vector 
.~=(x11.x12,x21,x22,~ , x,, 1, x,,2) in Bzn must be interpreted as follows: Xij = 1 means 
that the component ci is in mode j and .xij = 0 means that it is not in mode j. Let A denote 
the set of all vectors x E Bl,$ such that there is at least one index i E (1, , rz) with 
x;) = xi2. Because of (43) the vectors in A do not represent possible configurations. On 
the other hand, for a vector x E A”, let 
II={iE(l,..., n}:.w;I=l}, 
Z2={iE(l,,... n}: _T;2=1}. 
The components c; with i E 11 are intact and those with i E 12 are faulty. Then we have to 
define the probability p on Bzil as follows: 
0 ifx E A, 
p(x) = n;,,, Pi n;t,2(l - p;) if x E A”, 
(44) 
where p; is the probability that component ci is intact. This definition puts the probability 
of impossible configurations to zero. 
In the sequel we generalize these ideas to components with several failure modes. As in 
the case with two failure modes above, it will be assumed that every component ci must be 
in exactly in one of its possible operating modes, a requirement which is expressed by the 
logical formulas 
/nt(ci)V...Vm,,(ci) and -(mj(ci)Amk(c;)) (45) 
for all j # k and for all i = 1, . , II. These formulas have to be included into X,Y,.s. One can 
also eliminate the predicate m 1 (c;) (or similarly any other one) and replace each occurrence 
of it in X,Y,.5 by the formula -(mI(ci) v . v m,, (ci)). Then the first disjunction in (45) 
is not needed, and the second conjunction in (45) has only to be stated for j, k > 2. This 
modeling trick may be useful because there are less predicates than before. An alternative 
way of dealing with mutually exclusive predicates is described in (5,17,26]. 
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The logical theory developed in Section 4 also applies to this model. Note that among 
the minimal conflicts there may be the “trivial” conjunctions mj(ci) A mk(ci) from (45). 
unless one or both of mj (Ci) and mk(ci) are already conflicts themselves. 
We turn now to the probability structure of this model. The natural sample space to be 
considered here is constructed as follows. For each component ci let 
Oi ={ml....,mrz) 
be the set of possible modes. A system state can then be identified by an element of the 
product space 
O= n Oi. 
i=l.....n 
If pij denotes the prior probability that ci is in mode j, then given that each component c; 
must be in exactly one of its possible modes, we must have 
r, 
c pij = 1 
j=l 
(46) 
for all i = l,..., n. Again stochastic independence is assumed between the modes of 
different components. Then the probability of a system state x = (mj, , . . . , mjli) E (9 is 
given by 
PC’> = pl jl . . pnj,. (47) 
In order to link this probability model with the probability model of Section 4, we need 
another representation of the state space 0. To do this we generalize the idea that was 
described at the beginning of this subsection. Suppose that a state space 
is given, i.e., Xi E (ml,. . . , mrl ) for all i = 1, . . , n. Given the system state x we define a 
Boolean vector y(‘) of length Yi for each i = 1, . , II as follows: 
(i) Yj = 
1 ifxi =WZj, 
0 otherwise. 
(48) 
Each y (‘1 is therefore composed of exactly one 1, all other components being 0. Then we 
define the vector y = (y(l), . . , y(“)) of length m = t-1 + . . + r,. There is a bijective 
correspondence between the vectors y and the possible system states x and therefore 
the probability of a vector y is the same as the probability of its corresponding system 
state x, i.e., p(y) = p(x). The vectors y are elements of the Boolean cube B,, which 
is the set of interpretations of the propositional language S generated by all the atoms 
m,j (Ci). In the rest of the paper, S will always denote the propositional language generated 
by all the atoms mj(ci). If we define the probability of a vector in B, which does not 
correspond to a possible system state x to be zero, then we have a probability on the 
entire set B,. This implies that the probability p(f) of any formula f E S is obtained 
by summing the probabilities of all interpretations satisfying f . By this construction the 
general formalism considered in the previous sections applies again and the results given 
94 J. Kohlas et nl. /Artificial Intelligence 104 (1998) 7/-106 
there are still valid (in particular, the concepts of argument, quasi-support, and support 
are well defined). We are interested in computing the posterior probability p’(h) = sp(h) 
for some hypothesis h E S (p’ and sp are defined in the same way as in Section 5. I ). 
Since Eq. (38) is still valid, the basic problem is again the computation of p(qs(l.)) and 
p(qs(h)). 
The algorithms of Abraham and Heidtmann (in their generalized version presented in 
[23]) can still be applied to obtain disjoint decompositions of qs(_L) and qs(h). Among the 
disjoint conjunctions generated by these algorithms, there might be some of the form 
".Anz,j(Ci)A"'At~k(C;)A"' with j #k. (49) 
Of course, such conjunctions have zero probability because they do not correspond to a 
possible system state. Furthermore, these algorithms may also generate conjunctions of 
the form 
“‘A/n,j(Cf) A.” A^-??l.k(Ci) A”’ with j fk, (50) 
but the probability of such conjunctions is no longer simply given by the product of 
the probabilities of its literals. Although it is not difficult to compute the probability of 
a conjunctions of the form (50), it can be improved. A new decomposition algorithm 
presented in Appendix A avoids the generation of conjunctions of the form (49) and (50) 
thereby improving the efficiency of the computation of p(qs(l)) and p(qs(h)). 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper model-based diagnostics is looked at from a perspective of argumentation. 
This means that the actual observations about the system along with the model itself serve 
as material to generate arguments for hypotheses about the state of some components. To 
develop the whole theory, it is only needed to know when a system state is in conflict 
with the knowledge represented by the model and the observations. As a consequence, the 
language used to describe the available knowledge can be very general. The search for 
arguments leads to a qualitative or symbolic diagnostic analysis because the support of a 
hypothesis is explicitly represented by a logical formula. Theorem 8 shows that these ideas 
can be nicely expressed in the framework of the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence and 
assumption-based reasoning. 
On top of this qualitative analysis, it is possible to introduce a quantitative or numerical 
aspect. The importance of the arguments for a hypothesis is measured by the degree of 
support of the hypothesis. A degree of support of a hypothesis represents the strength with 
which the available information tends to prove the hypothesis. It corresponds to the idea 
of probability of provability as introduced by Pearl [27]. It turns out that the obtained 
support functions-called belief functions in the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence- 
are indeed Bayesian, i.e., they are regular probability measures in the model considered 
here. This means that we can also look at degrees of support as conditional probabilities. 
Corollary 7 gives a simple representation of the quasi-support and this result is used to 
design an algorithm to compute degrees of support more efficiently. 
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Appendix A. A new version of the algorithm of Abraham 
In this appendix a version of the algorithm of Abraham is presented that is more efficient 
than the one given in [23] when applied to systems having more than two operating modes. 
The reason for the better efficiency is that each component must be in exactly one operating 
mode, which is expressed by the formulas in S given in (45). If C denotes the collection 
of all those formulas then define 
<= Am. (A.1) 
OEZ 
Two formulas ft and .f2 in S are called <-disjoint if ft A f:! A 6 = 1. In this case 
we write ft @ f2 instead of ft v f2. It can easily be proved that @ is associative and 
commutative, so we can write eiE, fi for a collection fi, i E I of pairwise <-disjoint 
formulas. From now on, by a conjunction we mean a conjunction of literals over the 
atoms (mj(Ci): i = l,..., n, j = l,..., ri }. When necessary, we always simplify the 
conjunctions such that each literal appears only once. Note that if two formulas are disjoint 
then they are also c-disjoint. 
A conjunction is called positive if it does not contain any negated atom of the form 
-m,;(c;). If a DNF contains only positive conjunctions, it is called a positive DNF. 
Lemma A.l. Let c’ and c” be two positive conjunctions. Then c’ and c” are t-disjoint if 
and only if one of the following conditions is satisfied: 
(1) c’ or c” contains two liter& of the form mj (ci) and mk(c;) for Some i E (1, . n) 
undj#k, 
(2) there exist i E {1 , . . . , n} and two diflerent indices j and k in { 1. . . . , r;} such thmt 
mj (Ci) is u literal of c' and mk(ci) is u literal of 8’. 
This lemma provides an easy way to test if two conjunctions are C-disjoint. 
Before we formulate the next lemma, let us introduce some notation. For an atom 
v = m i (ci), if we define the set 
y={mk(c;): kE{l....,r;)-(j)} 
then we have 
(A.2) 
(A.3) 
As we are going to see later, to apply the algorithm described below we need a method to 
transform a DNF v in S into a positive DNF Q in S such that 
cpAC=rlAC. (A.4) 
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In addition, the conjunctions in the positive DNF r~ need to satisfy a certain property 
described below. The method goes as follows. Let c be a conjunction in S containing a 
negative literal -y and let c’ denote the conjunction obtained by removing -y from c. 
Then by Eq. (A.3) we have 
c A < = (-yc’) A < = (-yoc = 
c > 
v tc’ A (-. (A.3 
tty 
Since all conjunctions tc’ contain one negated atom less then c, a repeated application of 
this procedure will finally generate a collection of positive conjunctions ~1, . . . , qs such 
that c A 6 = (Vf=t vi) A 4. Now if p = ~1 v . . . v qm is a DNF in S, then the above 
procedure applied to each conjunction ci generates a collection of positive conjunctions 
VI>..., qr such that 
(Vl v~..vcPm)At =(m v...vllr) A<. (‘4.6) 
A positive conjunction c in S is called t-compatible if it does not contain a pair of atoms 
mj (ci), mk (ci) with j # k. Since vi At = J_ for a non t-compatible conjunction vi, we can 
remove the non c-compatible conjunctions vi in Eq. (A.6). This implies that every DNF (D 
in S can be transformed into a positive DNF r~ containing only t-compatible conjunctions 
andsuchthatpAr\==~r\. 
The following lemma will be used in the proof of the algorithm. 
Lemma A.2. Let c’ and c” be two positive conjunctions which are not c-disjoint. Let 
Y’ = {yl , . . , ys] denote the set of all literals contained in c’ but not in c”. Then we have 
( 1) if Y’ is empty then c’ v c” = c’, 
(2) if Y’ is not empty then 
(c’ v c”) A cfy (A.7) 
Note that all conjunctions that appear in Eq. (A.7) are positive. 
Before we formulate the new algorithm of Abraham we need some additional notation. 
Let c’ and c” be two positive conjunctions which are not <-disjoint. If Y’ = (yt , . , y,) is 
not empty, then define the set 
R(c’, c”) = {tc”: t E 5) u (yltc”: t E y2) u 
. . u {Yl . . .y,y_,tC”: t EK) (‘4.8) 
consisting of all positive conjunctions that are defined in Lemma A.2. Now we are in a 
position to formulate the following new version of the algorithm of Abraham. 
Algorithm. The input of the algorithm is a DNF g = gt v . . v gm. Then, using the 
procedure described above, g is transformed into a positive DNF ,f = fr v . V f& such 
that g A < = f A ( and all conjunctions ,fi are <-compatible. The positive conjunctions 
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fr , . . , fml are then the input for the following procedure whose result is the collection of 
sets Pi,j with j = 1, . . . . m’, i =O, . . . . . j - 1. 
for j = 1 to m 
po,i := U)) 
for i = 1 to j - 1 
Pi, j I= i4 
for all dk in Pi_1.j 
if dk and fi are <-disjoint (see Lemma A.l) then add dk to Pi,j 
else define Y’ = {yr , . . . , yl) to be the set of literals 
in fi that are not contained in dk 
if Y’ # fl then add all elements in R(fi, dk) to Pt,j. 
Theorem A.3. Let the DNF g = gl v . . . v g,,, be the input of the above algorithm and let 
PO.1 1.... Pm’-l.m’ be the sets Pj-l,j that the algorithm generates. Then these sets contain 
only positive conjunctions and we have 
kl ““*Vgm>A~= &@{dk E pj-l,j}] A<. (A.9) 
j=l 
Theorem A.4 The <-disjoint conjunctions in P = U{ Pj-1.j: j = 1, . . . , m’) generated 
by the algorithm are all c-compatible. 
Together with Theorem A.3 and Lemma A. 1 this result implies that the conjunctions c 
in P are such that 
0 c is positive, 
l if c contains the atom mj (ci), then c does not contain any atom in 
{ml(ci), . . ..mj-l(ci).mj+l(Ci), . . ..m~,(ct)}, (A. 10) 
l if c’ and 8’ are two conjunctions in P, then there is at least one i E { 1, . . . , n) and two 
different elements j and k in { 1, . . . , ri} such that mj(ci) is in C’ and mk(ci) is in c”. 
Now we show how to apply Theorems A.3 and A.4 to compute p(qs(_L)). First we need 
two lemmas: 
Lemma A.5 Let g be anyformula in S. Then p(g A c) = p(g). 
Lemma A.6 Let gl, . . , gr be a collection of mutually c-disjointformulas in S. Then 
Now we are in a position to formulate the following important result. 
(A.1 1) 
Corollary A.7. Let the DNF g = gl v . v g,, be the input of the above algorithm and let 
PO, 1, . . P,,,t__ I,,~ be the sets Pj-1.j that the algorithm generates. Then 
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m ’ 
Pk) =c c P(dk). 
j-1 clh~P,_,,, 
(A.12) 
In this corollary, if we take for g a DNF representation of qs(_L), i.e., qs(l_) = dcl v 
v dc,n, then formula (A. 12) implies 
(A.13) 
j=l &~P,.I., 
The probabilities p(dk) are easy to compute because they are positive <-compatible 
conjunctions according to Theorems A.3 and A.41 
if dk = A mj(Ci). then p(dk) = n pij, (A. 14) 
(i. j)EK (i.j)sK 
where p;] is the prior probability that component i is in mode j. Starting from a DNF 
representation of qs(h) obtained by using Corollary 7, Corollary A.7 can also be used to 
compute p(qs(h)) efficiently. Then the posterior probability of the hypothesis h is simply 
given by 
p’(h) = Pm(h)) - P(cP(-L)) 
1 - p(qdU) 
(A.15) 
according to Eq. (38). 
Example 5. Consider a system with four components having the following operating 
modes: 
cl: modesm) tom;r, Q: modes m 1 and m?. 
~2: modes ml to mq, (‘3: modes ml and m?. 
Suppose that 
Ml) = (mz(c) 1 A -W(C2) A -m4(c?) A tn2(c3)) 
v (ml(a) Am2(~4)) v (m2(cl) Am2Cc4)). 
First we transform the two conjunctions of qs(l) into the positive conjunctions 
f’~ = m2(c1) Ami(c2) Am2(c3), .f2 = m2(cl) A mz(c2) A m2(c3), 
.f3 = ml (Cl) A m(a). .f4 = m2(cl) A m2(c4). 
Then the algorithm produces the following sets for j = 1. (3: 
PO.1 ={.f11, 
PO.2 = If21 = e.2, 
PO.3 = if31 = PI.3 = p2.3 
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as the three conjunctions ft , f2 and f3 are mutually c-disjoint. More interesting is the step 
j = 4: we start with Pu.4 = { f4) and the iteration over i goes as follows: 
i = 1: fl and JI are not c-disjoint and we calculate Y’ = {PI, 171 I (cd}. Therefore, we 
get 
i = 2: the first three conjunctions in Pt,4 are t-disjoint with f2 so they will be put 
unmodified into P2,4, whereas the fourth conjunction is not <-disjoint with fi and 
so we have Y’ = (mz(c3)). This gives 
&.4= (m2h) Am2(c4) Aml(c2) AmI( 
m2(cl) A m2(c4) A m3(c2)> 
m2(cl) A m2(c4) A m4(c2)> 
m2(c1) AW(C4) ~m2(c2)JT(c3)}. 
i = 3: as all conjunctions in Pz.4 are <-disjoint with ,f3 we have P3.4 = P2.4 
Then the algorithm stops and according to Corollary A.7 we have 
P(q@-)) = &2(c1) A ml (~2) A w(c3)) 
+ P(m2h) A m2(c2) A m2k3)) 
+ _+l (Cl) A m2h)) 
+ p(m2@I) A m2(~4> A ml (~2) A m1@3)) 
+ P(m2k’l) A m2(c4) A Wk2)) 
+ &2(cl) A m2(c4) A m4k-2)) 
+!‘(m2(cl) Am2tc4) Am2(C2) Aml(C3)). 
Appendix B. Proofs of theorems 
Proof of Lemma 1. First suppose that X, f + h, i.e., X, ,f, -h =+ I, which is equivalent 
to X. c(x) =+ I whenever x b f, --h. We have to prove that X, c(x) =+ h whenever x + f, 
i.e., X, c(x), -h + I whenever x + f, which is equivalent to X, c(y) =+ J_ whenever 
y k c(x), --h for all x such that x /= f. So let x such that x + f and y such that 
y + c(x), -h and we must prove that X, c(y) =+ 1. But y k c(x) implies that y = x 
and we must prove that X, c(x) =+ 1. But x + f and x + -h (using x = y) imply that 
X, c(x) + -L by hypothesis. 
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Conversely, let x such that x b f and x /= 4 and we must prove that X, c(x) j _I_. 
But by hypothesis X, c(y) + _L for all y such that y /= c(x), -41 and for all x such that 
x b f (see above). This implies that we can take y = x and hence X, c(x) =+ 1. q 
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that CO is an implicant of cont. We must prove that 
XsYs, co =+ I, i.e., X,YY.Y, c(y) =+ I for all y such that y /= co. So let y such that y + CO. 
Since CO b VIGN c(x) we have y k VxcN, c(x) and hence there is x E N,. such that 
y /= c(x), which implies that y = x. Since x E N, we have X,,,Y, c(x) =$ _L and hence 
X,,.,5. c(y) + _L because x = y. 
Conversely, suppose that CO is a conflict set, i.e., X,,,, CO =+ I, i.e., Xsgs, c(x) =+ I for 
all x such that x + co. We must prove that CO /= cant, I.e., co + VxEN, c(x). So let y such 
that y /= co. By hypothesis it follows that XsY,, c(y) =+ i and hence y E N,. This implies 
that y I= C(Y) k VxEN,, day) and hence y t= \IxENc c(x) which completes the proof of the 
lemma. cl 
Proof of Lemma 3. First we prove (1). We must prove that if x + cant then X,,, c(x) + 
1. But x b cant implies that x E NC and hence X,,Y, c(x) + 1. 
Now assertion (2) is proved. Assume that X,YY,. f + I, i.e., X,,,, c(x) + i for all 
.x such that x + f. We must prove that if x g f then x + cont.. But by assumption 
x + ,f implies that X,,Y. c(x) =+ I and hence x E NC and therefore x /= VvEN, c(y), i.e., 
x b ccvzt. cl 
Proof of Lemma 4. First we prove (1). Using Lemma 1, we must prove that if x /= qs(h) 
then X. c(x) + h. But x /= qs(h) implies that there is y E Q(h) such that x b c(y) , i.e., 
there is y E Q(h) such that x = y. But this implies that XSY,Fr c(x) =+ h. 
Now assertion (2) is proved. Let x such that x /= f. Thus we must prove that x + qs(h), 
i.e.. x E Q(h), i.e., X,YJ,5, c(x) + h. But by hypothesis X, f =+ h and by Lemma 1 
X.c(x)*h sincex b,.f. El 
Proof of Lemma 5. First we prove (1): 
Now (2) is proved: it must be proved that qs(l) /= qs(lz), i.e., N(qs(l_)) C N(qs(h)), i.e., 
N,. & Q(h). So let x E N,, i.e., X,Y,,, c(x) =+ I and we must show that X,YY,, c(x) =+ h. But 
X,Y,,,Y. c(x) j h by definition means that X,YF,Y. c(p) =+ I for all y such that y + c(x), 4, 
which in turn is the same as XsYs, c(y) + i for all y E (x) n (t: t + m-h}. So let 
ye (x}n{t: t ~--h).Theny=xandsinceX,~~,,c(x)jiitfollowsthatX,,,c(y)=;>I 
and the lemma is proved. q 
Proof of Theorem 6. Since N(qs(lz)) = Q(h) we must prove that Q(h) = N(h) U N,. 
First we prove that Q(h) c N(h) U N,. Let x E Q(h), i.e., X,,, c(x) =+ h. If x E N(h) 
then we are done. So assume that x 6 N(h) and it must be proved that x E N,, i.e., 
X,Y,.,. c.(x) =+ 1. But Xsvs. c(x) =+ h is the same as 
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xsys, c(x). --h =+ L 
which is the same as 
03.1) 
X,,, C(Y) =+ 1 
for all Y such that Y b c(x), -h, which is the same as 
U3.2) 
X sys , C(Y) =+ A- (B.3) 
for all Y E {x} n N(-h). But since x 4 N(h) it follows that x E N(-h). Thus (B.3) implies 
that Xsys, c(x) =+ I, which is what was to be proved. 
Now we prove that N(h) U NC E Q(h). Since by the second assertion of Lemma 5 we 
have that N, G Q(h), it remains to prove that N(h) G Q(h). So let x E N(h) and we must 
prove that x E Q(h), which in turn is the same as 
X,yJ,y. c(y) + I for every y E (x} n N(--h) (B.4) 
as we have seen above. But x E N(h) implies that x $! N(--h) and hence (x} n N(--h) = !2i 
which implies that condition (B.4) is satisfied. q 
Proof of Corollary 7. This follows from Theorem 6 and (7). q 
Proof of Theorem 8. Everything follows easily from Theorem 6: 
qs(hr A h2) = (hl A h2) v qs(l) = (hl v qs(l)) A (hz v qs(l)) 
= qs(h1) A qdh2). 
qe1 v h2) = (Al v h2) v qs(l1 = (h, v qdl)) L’ (h2 v qs(i)) 
= qdh1) v qs(hz), 
qs(T) = T v qs(_L) = T. q 
Proof of Lemma 9. If Xsgs, f =$ _L then f is a contradictory argument and hence 
f b cdnt by the second assertion of Lemma 3. Conversely, assume that f + cant, i.e., 
N(f) C N(cont). We must prove that X,,, f =+ 1, which is equivalent to X,yys, c(x) + _L 
for all x E N(f) according to Lemma 1. But by Lemma 3, (1) we have X,,, &nt + I and 
hence by Lemma 1 Xsys, c(x) =+ _L for all x E N(cont). Since N(f) s N(cont) it follows 
that X,,. c(x) + I for all x E N(f). q 
Proof of Lemma 10. First we prove that s(h) is an argument of h, i.e., Xsys, s(h) + h. 
By Lemma 1 we must prove that X,,, c(x) =+ h for all x E N(s(h)) = N(qs(h)) n 
N(-qs(l)). By assertion (1) of Lemma 4 and by Lemma 1 we have Xsys, c(x) + h 
for all x E N(qs(h)). Since N(s(h)) 2 N(qs(h)) it follows that Xsvs, c(x) + h for all 
x E N(s(h)). 
Now we prove that s(h) is not a contradictory argument, which is the same as s(h) F 
qs(_L) according to Lemma 9. In other words, we must prove that 
N(0)) n N(q~(l))~ # fl. (B.5) 
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But we have 
N(m) f- N(qs(l))(’ =N(qs(h)) nN(-qs(l)) n N(qs(l))c‘ 
= N(qs(h)) nN(qs(l))” n N@(l)) 
= N(qm) f-l N(qs(l))’ 
= N(qs(h) A -qs(l)) 
= N(m) 
and hence Eq. (B.5) is satisfied because ~(s(h)) # 0 since s(h) # 1. q 
Proof of Corollary 11. By Corollary 7, we can write 
s(h) = qs(h) A -qs(l) = (h v qs(l)) A -qs(l) = h A -qs(l). 
Proof of Theorem 12. First remark that p” restricted to Nd equals p’. Then, according 
to (21), we can write 
sp(h) = p”(N(.s(h))) = p”(N(h A -qs(l))) 
= f+‘@(h) n &) = p’@(h) fl &) 
= PWW) n Nd) n Nd) 
P(Nd) 
= PO’(~) n ffd) 
P(N~) 
= p’(h). 0 
Proof of Lemma A.l. The ‘*if” part is obvious. To prove the “only if” part, assume that 
(1) and (2) are false. Then since (1) is false, c’ A c and c” A < are satisfiable and hence, 
since (2) is false, it is possible to find an interpretation x E B, satisfying c’ A c” A <. This 
shows that c’ A c” A < is not contradictory and the lemma is proved. q 
Proof of Lemma A.2. Since c’ and c” are not t-disjoint they are not disjoint. Then 
Theorem 5.27 [23, p. 1121 implies that if Y’ is empty then (1) is satisfied. Otherwise, if 
Y’ is not empty, the same theorem implies that 
c’ v c” = c’ + (“yt)c” + 4’1 (-y*)c” + “I + 4’1 ys_r (‘“y,y)c”. (B.6) 
Along with (A.3) this in turn implies that 
(c’ v c”) A ‘$ 
= c’< + -4‘1 c”C + )‘I -y*c”[ + . + 1’1 . y+t -_W”C 
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Proof of Theorem A.3. For a fixed j, first we have to prove by induction on i that Pi.1 
contains only positive conjunctions for all i c j. This is true for i = 0. i.e., PQ = (gj}. 
NOW suppose that this is true for Pi_ 1 ,j . Then, with dk E P, _ 1 .I the algorithm puts into Pi, j 
either the positive conjunction dk or the positive conjunctions in R(fi , dk). This proves 
that all conjunctions in P;,,j are positive and for i = j -- 1 we obtain that Pj-I,,, only 
contains positive conjunctions. Since j was arbitrary, this proves the first statement of the 
theorem. 
For Eq. (A.9). we prove again by induction on i that Pi.j has the following properties: 
(1) (.f~~~)~~~~~(fi~~)~(f~~~)=(,f~~~)~~~~’~(.f;~~)VIdk~~: dk6C.j); 
(2) ail conjunctions in P;,j are c-disjoint; 
(3) for all dk E Pi,,i , fk and dk are <-disjoint for all k E ( 1, . . i ). 
This is clearly true for i = 0, i.e.. Pu,j = {fj). We suppose that Pi_l,j satisfies these 
properties and let us show that Pi,j also satisfies them. First we prove assertion (1). By the 
induction hypothesis we have 
(.fl A 0 v v (fi A 6) v (fj A 0 
= (,f’l /‘, <) V ... V (f; A c$) V {dk A (1 dk E Pi_l,j] 
and we must prove that 
(.f~A~)v’..v(fiA~)VIdkA~: dkEf’-l.,,I 
=(f’l At) V..‘V(fi A<) V (dkA<: dk E P;,j). 03.7) 
First we show that if the left-hand side (LHS) of (B.7) is true then so is its right-hand side 
(RHS). Suppose that dk A c is true with dk E Pi-1.j. Two cases can happen. If dk and fi 
are t-disjoint, then dk is also in Pi,j and hence the RHS of (B.7) is also true. If dk and 
,fi are not e-dis,joint then again two cases can happen: if Y’ is empty then Lemma A.2( 1) 
(take c’ = fi and c” = dk) implies that (fi A <) V (dk A 6) = fi A < and hence fi A < is true 
and so is the RHS of (B.7); if Y’ is not empty then by Lemma A.2(2) we have 
(fiA~)v(rlkA~)=(f;A~)v{vA~: ~ER(,fi.dk)}. (B.8) 
Since dk A $ is true, the RHS of (B.8) is also true and hence the RHS of (B.7) is also true 
since R(fi, dk) G Pi,j. 
Now let us prove that if the RHS of (B.7) is true then its LHS is also true. So let dk A 6 
be true, with dk E f’i,j. There are only two ways for dk to be in Pi,j: either dk itself is 
in Pi- 1 ,j in which case the LHS of (B.7) is true; or else there is a d; in Pi_1.j such that 
dk E R(f, . di). In this case dk = di A IJ for some conjunction U. Hence, since dk A < is 
true, so is d; A IJ A 4 and so is di A 6, which implies that the LHS of (B.7) is true because 
d; E Pi-1.j. 
The assertions (2) and (3) are clearly true. 
Note that pr0pet-Q (3) implies that (ft A 6) V . V (fi A [) and $(dk A [: dk E Pi,j) 
are c-disjoint. Then, taking i = ,j - 1, we get 
(f~ A $) ‘J . V Cfj A e) 
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and then by induction on j we obtain 
(fl A C) v . . . v (fm~ A 0 
=${d&: dktPo,,}@.@{d& d/&P,,,,_,,,,}. 
Since g A e = S A 6 (see the preamble of the algorithm) it follows that 
(SI V...“gm)A<= &@{dk E Pj-1.i) A[ 
j=l 
and the theorem is proved. q 
Proof of Theorem A.4. The result follows from the fact that all sets P~J, j = 1, . , m’, 
i = O...., j - 1 generated by the algorithm contain only c-compatible conjunctions. 
Indeed, P0.j = (fj] and ,fj is $-compatible and it remains to prove that if all conjunctions 
in Pi_1.j are c-compatible then all conjunctions in Pi,j are also <-compatible. Let dk in 
Pi_t,j. If dk and fi are c-disjoint then the new element dk in Pi,j is <-compatible. It 
remains to prove that if dk and fi are not c-disjoint and Y’ # 6? then all conjunctions in 
R(fi, dk) are $-compatible. To prove this, it is clearly sufficient to show that if mj(ch) is 
an atom in Y’, then it does not appear as an atom of dk. On the contrary, suppose that the 
atom ml(ch) is in dk. Since fi and dk are not t-disjoint, we must have j = 1 and hence 
mj(ch) = nzl(ch) which is a contradiction because mj(c/,) E Y’ and Y’ does not contain 
any atom of dk. 0 
Proof of Lemma AS. First note that p(-<) = 0 because the interpretations satisfying 
-$ do not correspond to possible system states. Since g = (g A 6) + (g A -4) it follows 
that 
N(g) = N(g At) + N(g A-t) G-3.9) 
and hence 
P(6) = !‘(A’ A t) + P(g A -t-) = p(g A t) 
because 0 < p(g A -<) < ~(-0 = 0. 0 
(B.lO) 
Proof of Lemma A.6. By the inclusion-exclusion formula (39) we have 
(B.11) 
But, since the gi are mutually <-disjoint, for all I containing at least two elements k and 1 
we have 
< P((gk A e) A (I3 A f,) = P(l) = 0. (B.12) 
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Therefore, 
c (-lP+lP /\k AtI =-&(gi Act) 
M#l~(l,..,,rl (i,, ’ ’ i=l 
(B.13) 
and since p(gi A 6) = p(gi) by Lemma A.5 we obtain Eq. (A.1 1). q 
Proof of Corollary A.7. We can write 
(by Lemma AS) 
= P 
(( 
@@ldk EPj-l,.jl (by Theorem A.3) 
j=l 
(by Lemma A.6). q 
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